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ABSTRACT
This article provides an objective assessment of the potential risks that
foreign lawyers face in China as they push the boundaries of the limits on their
activities set by Chinese law. When the Shanghai Bar Association (SBA), a
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government-controlled organization, accused foreign lawyers of violating Chinese
law and called for official action, some scholars dismissed the threat, claiming that
there was no legal basis for a crackdown on foreign lawyers. These scholars
erroneously maintained that the Chinese laws that regulate foreign lawyers are
ambiguous and create "gray areas." In fact, the claims of the SBA are justified
because the applicable provisions of Chinese law are clear and unambiguous, and
the conduct of some foreign firms appears to plainly exceed what is permitted.
Foreign firms are at risk of being found to have violated relevant legislative
enactments, particularly because of the rise of nationalism in China and the
emergence of a hostile regulatory environment that poses threats to foreign
investors, including foreign law firms.
This article sounds an alarm for foreign law firms currently practicing in
China and for other firms contemplating entering the Chinese legal market. After
providing an overview of the laws regulating foreign lawyers, this article examines
the plain meaning of these laws. Since the Chinese government has not issued an
official interpretation of the two most relevant laws, it is imperative for firms to
focus on the actual wording of the governing provisions. An examination of their
"plain meaning" reveals that the laws are clear and unambiguous. Any effort to
argue that the relevant provisions are ambiguous is ill-advised because that
argument masks the perils faced by foreign law firms and their clients.
Finally, this article examines certain unique features of the Chinese legal
environment, such as local protectionism, judicial corruption, and the existence of
the adjudication committee. These issues, though not taught in Chinese law
schools, are clearly understood by practicing Chinese lawyers. However, they are
often not adequately appreciated by foreign lawyers.

I. INTRODUCTION
Although the fast-food giant McDonald's had early access to the Chinese
market in the 1990s, international law firms met various obstacles while trying to
2
gain a foothold in China's legal market. The Chinese government was concerned
*
Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law. I am grateful to Vincent
Johnson for his encouragement and insightful comments. I also thank Katie Neidig, Cali
Frank, Daniella Alvarado, Monique Wimberly, and Jessica Manka for their excellent
assistance.
I
See Nick Driver, A Cultural Revolution in Beiing, Via Golden Arches:
Mcdonald's: Billions Served? The Fast-FoodGiant Hopes to Serve A Billion More as Its
Eatery Opens on One of the City's Busiest Corners, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 23, 1992),
http://articles.latimes.com/1992-04-23/news/mn-1304_1_golden-arches.
McDonald's
opened its first store in Shenzhen, China in 1990. Id.
2
American Chamber of Commerce, People'sRepublic of China, American Business
in
China:
2011
White
Paper,
AMCHAM-CHINA
296-300
(2011),
http://web.resource.amchamchina.org/cmsfile/2011/04/28/8ff~c3d4dl4f50713elbe8f538b4
3f80.pdf ("Yet international law firms in China still face a wide range of market access
constraints, including: (1) the inability to provide comprehensive legal services to their
clients; (2) a prohibition against participating in certain meetings in certain government
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that Chinese law firms were still in a developing stage and not ready to compete
3
with multinational corporations. In addition, the entry of international firms was
reminiscent of the country's humiliating past at the turn of the twentieth century
when the Western imperial powers disparaged Chinese law as a barbaric regime.4
For practical reasons, the government feared that foreign firms would bring Western
legal concepts into Chinese courtrooms, such as separation of powers, judicial
independence, and constitutionalism.
When China became an official member of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in 2001, it promised to open its services markets, including the legal
market.6 China had no choice but to keep its promise, but it did so with a stringent
restriction that foreign law firms could not practice Chinese law.7 Today, China's
wariness of foreign influence on its legal system remains as deep as it was in the
1990s. Thus, the government has held fast to its rule that foreign firms cannot
practice Chinese law. With the recent rise of fervent nationalism in China, the
government has become stricter on international corporations. 8
Despite restrictions, the Chinese legal market presents a great potential for
international law firms because of the increase in international trade.9 Even while
prohibited from practicing Chinese law, foreign law firms have found ways to thrive
in China-providing high-end non-litigation services that domestic firms are less
competitive at supplying. These services include assistance with mergers and
acquisitions, overseas initial public offerings, foreign litigation and arbitration,
technology transfers, real estate transactions, intellectual property protection, and
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) compliance.10 In 1992, China had only a

departments involving their clients; (3) an unnecessarily difficult, delayed and unpredictable
registration process for the establishment of representative offices (or the opening of new
ones); (4) unfavorable tax policies; and (5) other operational restrictions"). See also, U.S.
Trade Rep., 2014Reportto Congress on China's WTO Compliance, at 134-35 (Dec. 2014).
3
See Rachel E. Stern & Su Li, The Outpost Office: How InternationalLaw Firms
Approach the China Market, 41 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 184, 190 (2016).
4
DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN A
NUTSHELL 5 (West Group 3d ed. 2015); Zhang Ziyang, Zhouqicing: YDo ga~nyu xiang xffng

cuowit sichio liangjian(AM-:
19
[Zhou Qiang: To Dare to the
Wrong
What
to
the
West
Sword],
CHINA
NEWS
(Jan.
14,
2010),
http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2017/01-14/8124300.shtml (discussing how Zhou Qiang, the
President of the Supreme People's Courts, called for a crusade against the erroneous Western
ideas of separation of powers and judicial independence).
See Ziyang, supranote 4; Susan E. Vitale, Doors Widen to the West: China'sEntry
in the World Trade Organization Will Ease Some Restrictions on Foreign Law Firms, 7
WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y, 223, 248 (2001).
6
Thomas Rumbaugh & Nicolas Blancher, China: International Trade and WTO
Accession 8 (IMF, Working Paper No. 04/36, 2014), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/wp/2004/wp043 6.pdf.
7
Stern & Li, supra note 3, at 189.
See infra Part VIII.
9
Stern & Li, supra note 3, at 185.
to
Id.

134

Arizona JournalofInternational& ComparativeLaw

Vol. 35, No. 1

2018

handful of international law firms. As of 2015, there were 229 representative
offices of foreign law firms registered with the Ministry of Justice."
This article provides an objective assessment of the potential risks that
foreign lawyers face as they continue to push the boundaries of the legal limits set
by China's laws. For example, the Shanghai Bar Association (SBA), a governmentcontrolled organization, 12 accused foreign lawyers of violating the Chinese law.1 3
The alleged offenses include unauthorized practice of Chinese law and others:
(1)Hiring licensed Chinese lawyers;
(2) Drafting Chinese legal documents;
(3) Conducting due diligence;
(4) Engaging in litigation and arbitration;
(5)Handling registrations, applications, and filings with government agencies;
(6) Controlling Chinese law firms;
(7) Using misleading propaganda; and
(8) Avoiding Chinese taxes and foreign currency controls. 14

it SifA bu wing (ri 4-M3FJ) [Justice Department of the Network], Guanyu 229 Jiawai
Guolv Shishi Wu Suo Zhuhua DaibiaoJigou Tongguo 2015 Nian Du Jian Yan Huo Zhun Zai
Zhong Guo Jing Nei Zhi Ye [De Di] Gong Gao (Af 229
t#Effff ±#49I0fffl
I
2015 4& &
40M/9L9000)
r4#71
[About 229 Foreign Law Firms in
China Through the 2015 Inspection Approved to Practice in China], DFFTW (Sept. 12,
2016), http://www.dffyw.com/sifashijian/ziliao/201609/41156.html (discussing a Public
Notice regarding 229 representative offices of foreign law firms passed annual inspection
and gained permission to provide legal services in China in 2015). Global Trade Relations'
website provides an updated list of news articles about international trade issues. News
Updates, GLOBAL TRADE REL. http://www.globaltraderelations.net/newsupdates.html (last
visited Oct. 7, 2017); Lucy Homby & Charles Clover, China Fines Audi and Chryslerfor
Price Fixing, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/69fff63a-3991-11 e483c4-00144feabdcO; U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., COMPETING INTERESTS IN CHINA'S
COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT: CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY LAw APPLICATION AND THE
ROLE OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY (2014), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/am
lfinal_090814_finallocked.pdf [hereinafter COMPETING INTERESTS IN CHINA].
12
ShanghaiBarAssociation, AM. BAR Ass'N, https://www.americanbar.org/content/

dam/aba/uncategorized/intemational law/intemational bar associations/shanghai bar ass
ociation.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2017) (explaining that the SBA "is under
the direction and supervision of the Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Justice").
13 Dan Harris, China's ForeignLawyers Are Under Siege, HARRIS | BRICKEN (May 11,
2006),
http://www.chinalawblog.com/2006/05/chinas foreignlaw-firmsunder.html;
Confidential Reporter, China Poised to Crack Down on Foreign Law Firms, CHINA
CONFIDENTIAL (May 11, 2006), http://chinaconfidential.blogspot.com/2006/05/chinapoised-to-crack-down-on-foreign.html. Shanghai Bar Assoc Say Foreign Law Firms
Constitute Threat To Justice & Economic Safety Of China, PRAC. SOURCE,
https://practicesource.com/shanghai-bar-assoc-say-foreign-law-firms-constitute-threat-tojustice-a-economic-safety-of-china/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2017).
14
Sida Liu, Globalizationas Boundary-Blurring:InternationalandLocalLawFirms
in China's CorporateLaw Market, 42 L. & Soc. REv., 771, 795 (2008).
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Some scholars responded by dismissing the threat of government action
and claiming that there was no legal basis for a crackdown on foreign lawyers
because the relevant provisions in Chinese laws were ambiguous and created "gray
area." 15 However, the claims of the SBA are not baseless. The applicable
provisions of Chinese law are clear, unambiguous, and the conduct of some foreign
firms appears to plainly exceed what is permitted. Foreign firms are at risk of being
found to have violated relevant legislative enactments, particularly because of the
rise of nationalism in China and the emergence of a hostile regulatory environment
that poses threats to foreign investors, including foreign law firms.
This article sounds an alarm for foreign law firms currently practicing in
China and for other firms contemplating entering the Chinese legal market. First,
the article provides an overview of the laws applicable to foreign lawyers. Second,
it examines the "plain meaning" of these laws. Since the Chinese government has
not issued an official interpretation of the two most relevant laws, it is imperative
for firms to focus on the actual wording of the governing provisions. An
examination of their "plain meaning" reveals that the laws are clear and
unambiguous. Any effort to argue that the relevant provisions are ambiguous is illadvised because that argument masks the real perils faced by foreign law firms and
their clients.
Finally, this article examines certain unique features of the Chinese legal
environment, such as local protectionism, judicial corruption, and the existence of
the adjudication committee. These issues, though not taught in Chinese law
schools, are clearly understood by practicing Chinese lawyers. However, they are
often not adequately appreciated by foreign lawyers.

II. A FOREIGN CITIZEN CANNOT BE LICENSED AS A PRACTICING
LAWYER IN CHINA
In 1986, the Ministry of Justice held the first national examination for
qualification to practice law.16 In 1996, the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress (NPC) enacted the Lawyers Law of China (Lawyers Law),
which specifies the requirements for becoming a lawyer. 1 Under the law, a
candidate must first pass the national examination and then obtain a practice
certificate to become a licensed practicing lawyer.' 8 To sit for the national
qualification examination, a candidate must have three years of legal education at
an institution of higher learning, have an equivalent professional level of experience,
or have acquired an undergraduate education in another major at an institution of
Liu, supra note 14, at 780.
Jane J. Heller, China's New Foreign Law Firm Regulations, 12 PAC. RIM L.
POL'Y J. 751, 755 (2003).
Lvshi Fa (it 9W 4t) [The Lawyers Law of the People's Republic of China]
15

&

16

(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective June 1,

2008),

is

LAWINFOCHINA

Id. at art. 6.

(China) [hereinafter The Lawyer's Law].
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higher learning. 1 9 The law did not require a law degree from a law school to sit for
the national examination.
The Ministry of Justice issued a notice that requires a candidate to have an
undergraduate degree in law, or an undergraduate degree in other qualifying
subjects, along with knowledge of the law, to sit for the national bar. 20 In addition,
the Ministry requires that a candidate for the bar exam have Chinese citizenship and
uphold the Chinese Constitution, which makes obeying the Communist Party of
China (the Party) a fundamental principle. 21 In summary, a practicing lawyer in
China must:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

obtain an undergraduate degree in law or another discipline
and possess knowledge of law;
pass the national lawyer's examination;
obtain a practice license;
hold Chinese citizenship (residents from Taiwan, Hong
Kong, and Macau may qualify); and
pass criminal background checks.22

A foreign citizen is not qualified to sit for the national bar exam.23 Without
passing the national bar exam, a foreign citizen cannot be licensed in China.24 It is
illegal to practice law without a license. Article 13 of the Lawyers Law (amended,
2007) provides, "a person who has not acquired a lawyer's practicing certificate
shall not engage in legal practices in the name of a lawyer." 25

III. THE REGULATIONS AND RULES ON FOREIGN LAWYERS
To regulate foreign lawyers, the State Council promulgated the
Administrative Regulations on Representative Offices of Foreign Law Firms in
26
China (Regulations), which took effect on January 1, 2002.
The Ministry of
Justice issued the Rules Concerning the "Enforcement of the Regulations on the

19

Sft bu (01

#;

M) [Ministry of Justice], 2017 Nian Guojia Shifa Kaoshi Gonggao

-i
AT [2017 Notice State Judicial Exam Announcement], SINA
(June
5,
2017),
http://edu.sina.com.cn/zgks/2017-06-05/doc-ifyfuzny
3239700.shtml [hereinafter 2017 Notice State JudicialExam].
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
The Lawyers Law, supra note 17, at art. 5.
25
Id. at art. 13.
26
Waiguo Lvshi Shiwu Suo Zhuhua Daibiao Jigou Guanli Tiaoli ( L#iYt$*#$t
RS'Mt Litffl
930~) [Administrative Regulations on Representative Offices of Foreign
Law Firms in China] (promulgated by the State Council of the People's Republic of China,
Dec. 22, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002), LAWINFOCHINA (China) [hereinafter Regulations].
2017

ffA

EDUCATION
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Management of Representative Office set up by Foreign Firms in China" (the
Rules), which took effect on September 1, 2002.27
The Ministry of Justice, as one of the 27 ministries of the State Council, is
under direct leadership of the State Council. Therefore, regulations enacted by the
State Council enjoy higher status than rules issued by ministries. The purpose of a
ministry's rules is to provide guidance and clarification on how a State Council
28
It is common that the State Council enacts a
regulation works in practice.
regulation that leaves ample room for a relevant ministry to fill in the details.
Authorized by the Constitution, a ministry routinely issues departmental rules for
29
implementing State Council regulations.
Both the Regulations and Rules on
foreign law firms are administrative enactments and are legally binding.30 Foreign
firms must abide by the Regulations, Rules, and other Chinese laws.
The Regulations promulgated by the State Council only provide a broad
outline of how foreign lawyers are regulated. The Ministry of Justice's Rules
interpret the Regulations. They also detail the qualification criteria, application and
registration procedures, and legal responsibilities of foreign applicants. The
Ministry of Justice and Provincial Justice Departments are responsible for
32
implementing Regulations and Rules.
To determine the precise meaning of an
administrative provision, a practicing lawyer must consult both enactments.
Without exception, the Regulations and Rules apply to foreign law firms
that provide legal services in China. The purpose of the enactments is to set a
code of conduct for foreign law firms in the Chinese legal market. 34 No foreign law
firm may treat the enactments in a selective manner. It is a privilege, not a right,
for a foreign firm to operate in China. A foreign law firm with a presence in China
acts as a legal person under Chinese law. As such, the firm must respect all Chinese
laws, not only the enactments at issue.35 Violations of the enactments will result in
disciplinary actions by the Provincial Justice Department. If the violation is serious,
36
the Ministry of Justice will revoke the law firm's business license.

Sifa Bu Guanyu Zhixing Waiguo Lvshi Shiwu Suo Zhuhua Daibiao Jigou Guanli
TiaoliDe Guiding [YiXiuding(1 4t
ft4AT
(
% }j lL
M ) n3 A 5t [ E R
% iT) [Provisions of the Ministry of Justice on the Execution of the
Regulations on the Administration of Foreign Law Firms' Representative Offices in China,
Revised] (promulgated by the Ministry of Justice, July 4, 2002, effective Sept 1, 2002,
amended, Sept. 2, 2004) LAWINFOCHINA (China) [hereinafter Rules].
28
See Legislation Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by Nat'l
People's Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000), ch. 3, Congressional-Executive
Commission on China [hereinafter Legislation Law of the PRC].
29
Id. See also XIANFA art. 90, § 3 (2004) (China).
30
CHOW, supranote 4, at ch. 5.
31
Regulations, supra note 26, at art. 3.
32
Id. at art. 9.
33
Id. at art 1.
34
Id.
35
Id. at art. 3.
36
Regulations, supra note 26, at ch. 5.
27
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IV. REGULATIONS AND RULES IN DETAIL
The Regulations consist of thirty-five articles in six chapters. Chapter One
sets forth the general requirements. Applicants must: (1) comply with Chinese laws
and regulations and adhere to professional ethics and practice disciplines for
Chinese lawyers;3 7 (2) not harm China's state security and public interests, 38 and;
(3) remain civilly responsible for their legal services rendered within the territory
of China.3 9
Chapter Two lays out the application requirements and procedures for
foreign law firms to set up representative offices in China. A foreign law firm
applicant must demonstrate that it is admitted for law practice in its home country
and has not been sanctioned for ethics violations.40 Chapter Two also requires the
foreign firms' representatives to be admitted for law practice in their home country
and engaged in the practice of law for at least two years prior to the application.41
The head of the representative office must possess three years of law practice
experience before the application.42 In addition, the applicant must demonstrate
why it is necessary to open a representative office in China. 43
Upon receiving the application, the Justice Bureau of the provincial
government conducts a preliminary review and decides whether to submit the
application to the Ministry of Justice in Beijing." The Ministry of Justice has six
months to decide whether to permit the applicant to open a representative office in
China. 45 With a permit from the Ministry of Justice, the foreign law firm registers
with the Justice Bureau and obtains a business license, which must be renewed
annually. The bureau has the right to terminate a law firm's business license if the
46
firm is no longer qualified to practice in China.

A. Scope of Services
Chapter Three defines five areas of services that a representative office is
permitted to engage in. Although it cannot provide legal services on Chinese law
issues, a representative office may:
(1) Provide clients with consultative services regarding the laws of the
country where the representative office and its lawyers are admitted for
law practice or consultative services regarding international laws;
37
38

39
40
41
42
43

44
45
46

Regulations, supra note 26, at art. 3.
Id
Id. at art. 4-5.
Id. at art. 7(2).
Id. at ch. 2.
Regulations, supra note 26, at art. 7.
Id
Id. at art. 8-9.
Id. at art. 9.
Id. at art. 13-14.
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(2) Represent a client or a Chinese law firm to handle legal issues of the
country where the office and its lawyers are admitted for law practice;
(3) Retain Chinese law firms for clients to deal with legal affairs;
(4) Retain a Chinese law firm on a long-term contract basis to handle legal
issues; and
(5) Provide clients with information on the impact of the Chinese legal
environment. 4 7
How can a representative office practice Chinese law without offering a
legal opinion on its concrete legal issues? In essence, the five permitted areas reflect
the lawmakers' desire to make a foreign law firm's representative office serve as an
intermediary between either foreign enterprises and Chinese law firms, or between
Chinese enterprises and foreign law firms. 48 Foreign enterprises planning to enter
the Chinese market often find it convenient to work with a foreign law firm that has
a representative office in China. Due to language and cultural barriers, it is a
daunting task for a foreign enterprise to establish a business relationship with a
Chinese law firm. Although it is not allowed to provide specific legal opinions on
concrete Chinese law issues, the representative office may provide general
information about the impact of the Chinese legal environment. When a specific
Chinese law issue arises, the representative office may refer the issue to a
trustworthy Chinese law firm with which it has a long-term relationship. In
addition, when a Chinese investor is planning to expand business in a foreign
country where the representative office and its lawyers are admitted for law
practice, the office could be better suited than a foreign firm without such a presence
49
in China to facilitate the investment.

B. Legal Responsibilities
A representative office could face criminal penalties if it seriously violates
China's state security, public security, or social order.
Penalties include
permanently barring the office and its lawyers from returning to the Chinese market
for life. 50 If the office's violations do not warrant criminal penalties, it could still
face administrative sanctions.

Regulations, supra note 26, at art. 15.
Stern & Li, supranote 3, at 192 ("[L]awyers from the vast majority of firms from
continental Europe, Asia, and Latin America defined their market niche as handling work
from their home country or region. For example, bread-and-butter work for an Italian law
firm might include outbound work (e.g., helping an Italian luxury brand franchise in China)
as well as inbound work (e.g., guiding a Chinese company's efforts to acquire an Italian
business).").
49
Telephone interview with Liu Honghui, Partner, The Jingsh Law Firm (Dec. 28,
2016).
5o
Regulations, supra note 26, at art. 31.
5
Id. at art. 24.
47

48
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If the representative office exceeds the scope of permitted practice areas
and provides a legal opinion on concrete Chinese law issues, it could face various
sanctions, ranging from suspension of business for correction or administrative
fines of RMB 50,000 ($7,500) to RMB 200,000 ($30,000) to revocation of its
52
business license.
Additionally, employing Chinese licensed attorneys could
subject a representative office to similar penalties.
Settling accounts for legal services fees outside the Chinese territory could
subject a representative office to a fine of no less than 100% of the amount and no
more than 300% of the amount.54 In addition, the office may also face temporary
suspension or revocation of its business license, depending on the seriousness of the
violation. 5 It is in China's best financial interest to have all foreign firms settle
accounts in China for the fees charged from the legal services they rendered. Such
a requirement also makes it easier for the government to supervise the foreign firms'
activities.
The Regulations also impose severe administrative sanctions on the
representative office for other violations, including revealing business secrets,
working at two representative offices simultaneously, and providing false
56
information.
The sanctions range from administrative fines to business license
revocation.
If a representative office loses its business license for violating
Regulations but not the criminal law, the office and its lawyers are barred from the
58
Chinese market for five years.
The Regulations also sanction officials at the justice departments and
Ministry of Justice who derelict their duties in granting licenses to foreign law firms
to set up representative offices. 5 9 An official may be demoted for failing to examine
application materials, conduct annual inspections, or collect excessive fees. 60In
addition, an official can be demoted or fired for granting licenses to unqualified
foreign law firms, taking bribes for special favors, reducing fines, or embezzling
funds.61 An official may face criminal penalties if his or her illegal acts, such as
dereliction of duty, abuse of power, or corruption, have caused serious damage to
public property or state interests.62

52

Regulations, supra note 26, at art. 25.

53
54
5

Id.

56

57
58

59
60
61
62

Id. at art. 26.
Id.
Id. at art. 27, 29.
Regulations, supra note 26, at art. 24.
Id. at art. 31.
Id. at art. 3 2.
Id
Id. at art. 33.
Regulations, supra note 26, at art. 33.
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C. Enforcement
The Ministry of Justice and Provincial Justice Departments (PJD) are
responsible for the enforcement of the Regulations and Rules.63 A foreign law firm
wishing to establish a representative office in a city in China needs to file an
application with a respective PJD. After a preliminary review, the PJD refers the
application to the State Council for the final decision.65 Upon receiving the State
Council's approval, the representative office and its representatives must register
with the PJD before rendering legal services.66 The Regulations also require that
67
the representative office and representatives register with the PJD annually.
The PJD inspects foreign law firms annually, and if the PJD finds that a
firm's conduct warrants further investigation, it will create a record and send PJD
officials to visit the alleged law firm office to review relevant materials, interview
lawyers, and collect evidence. Upon completing the investigation, the PJD will
issue an investigation report to the alleged firm.
Subsequently, the PJD's
disciplinary division will call the firm to a hearing, during which the alleged firm
has the right to confront the evidence and defend its conduct. Depending on the
degree of the violation, the PJD will impose penalties ranging from public
reprimand, or fine, to suspension.68 The firm has the right to petition the PJD for
an administrative review of the penalties. 69 After exhausting administrative
channels, the firm has the right to sue the PJD in court.7 0 Because the local court is
subject to the PJD's influence, there is virtually no chance for a firm to overturn the
PJD's decision.
On November 9, 2012, the Guangdong Provincial Justice Department
(GPJD) suspended the operations of a representative office of Hengji, a Singapore

63

Regulations, supra note 26, at ch. 5.

at art. 8.

64

Id.

65

Id. at art. 9.
Id. at art. 10.
Id
Dui Weifan

66
67

( Waiguo Lvshi Shiwu Suo Zhuhua DaibiaoJigou Guanli Tiaoli
ffl*0*4# 9
f
f
MAkN) [Penaltiesfor

)

68

De Chufa (X1iS
violation of the Regulations on the Administration of Foreign Law Firms' Representative
Offices in China], PEOPLE'S GOV'T OF HUBEI PROVINCE, http://www.hbsf.gov.cn/gk/qzqc/
hzcf/28955.htm (last updated Dec. 24, 2015); Regulations, supra note 26, at art.10.
69 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Chufa Fa (ThitAX5J'&T
IY
T
4) [Law of The People's Republic of China on Administrative Penalty] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 17, 1996, effective Oct. 1, 1996, amended,
Aug. 27, 2009) art. 6, LAWINFOCHINA (China).
70

Id.

71

Li Jing, Fu Ying: Jinnian "Min Gao Guan" Xingzheng Susong An Yuangao

Shengsu Lv Mingxian Xiajiang(f4i
"Nt 4 '" f
if
*,
W2
) [Fu
Ying: "The People Complained" the Chances of Winning an Administrative Law Suit Have
Decreased Dramatically in Recent Years] , PEOPLE'S NETWORK (Mar. 4, 2014),
http://1ianghui.people.com.cn/2014npc/n/2014/0304/c376798-24523286.html.
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based law firm, for violation of the Regulations and Rules. The GPJD found that
Hengji illegally set up the representative office, representing both Chinese and
foreign clients and charging high fees.7 3 During the investigation process, the
GPJD removed Hengji's nameplate hanging at the entrance of the office building,
confiscated its promotional pamphlets, and seized other materials for further
investigation.
Unfortunately, there is no official source for finding PJD's
disciplinary actions. The following could be the reasons for the lack of reports on
sanctions for foreign law firms' violations of the Regulations and Rules:
(1) The Justice Bureau will not start an investigation of a foreign law firm's
representative office for violation of the Regulations and Rules until it
finds irregularities or receives formal complaints.
(2) The law does not require the Ministry of Justice to make its disciplinary
actions available to the public. Therefore, it is impossible to conduct
reliable research on whether a firm is sanctioned or how many firms have
been sanctioned.
(3) Even when a client has a dispute with a foreign law firm and files a
formal complaint, the Ministry of Justice often persuades the parties to
reach a settlement, the result of which is not accessible to the public. 7 5
No law requires the Ministry of Justice and the Justice Bureaus to make
all their administrative sanctions known and available to the public. Also, foreign
law firms and lawyers are unlikely to publicize violations and sanctions. Chinese
government entities do not release all such information on a regular basis or in a
systematic manner. Further, Chinese government websites do not routinely publish
administrative orders and sanctions. The government entities constantly delete
website content without notice.
The following example illustrates how volatile the government
information system is. In 2005, the Beijing Justice Bureau sanctioned Gaote
Xiongdi, a foreign firm, for violating the Regulations and Rules. The decision is
no longer available on the Bureau's website. A search using Google, which is
blocked in China, leads only to a link of the decision archived by TOTOO, a private
website.76 Therefore, it is unreasonable to draw a conclusion that the Chinese
government has not enforced the law based on a failure to locate administrative
decisions.
72
Xing Hui, Guangdong Chachu Shouzong Waigguo Feifa Lvshi Shiwu Suo Anjian
(,
&
$ $# t #P# fffff#ff #) [The Guangdong Provincial Department of
Justice Investigates the Caseof the FirstForeignLaw Firm], LEGAL DAILY (Nov. 13, 2012),
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/Lawyer/content/2012-11/13/content_3981025.htm?node=
34488.

73
74
75
76

Id.
Id.

Telephone interview with Liu Honghui, supra note 49.
See Rader, Gaote Beiing Weifa Zhiye Bei Chufa (u#tRi
;#9S## M)
[Beifing Illegal Practice Gaote is Punished], TOTOO tM s ARCHIVER (Sept. 27, 2005),
http://www.old.totoo.org/archiver/?tid-25410.html.
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V. NO OFFICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE REGULATIONS AND
RULES
Under Chinese law, regulations and rules can only be construed according
to the original wording of the two legal enactments. The State Council (the Central
Government of China) has the sole power to interpret regulations and rules. As
Professor Daniel Chow observed, unlike Western legal systems, Chinese courts
have no authority to interpret administrative laws and regulations put forth by the
government.
Chow further stated: "Under the current practice, only the State
Council and its departments have the power to interpret administrative regulations
and to the exclusion of all other government organs, including the Supreme People's
Court."
The State Council's power to interpret the regulations and rules is
codified in Article 33 of the Ordinance Concerning the Procedures for the
Formulation of Administrative Regulations.7 9
The power to interpret rules belongs to the formulating organs of
rules [the State Council or Ministries]. The formulating organs
shall give interpretations to the rules that fall under one of the
following circumstances:
(1) the specific meaning of their provisions needs to be
further defined; or
(2) after their formulation, new development makes it
necessary to define the basis to which they are applied.
Interpretations of rules shall be proposed by the legislative affairs
departments of the formulating organs with reference to the
procedures for the examination of the draft rules for examination,
and they shall be promulgated after submission to and approved
by the formulating organs.
Interpretations of rules have the same force and effect as the rules
themselves.
So far, neither the State Council nor the Ministry of Justice has put out any
official interpretation of the Regulations and Rules on foreign lawyers. Therefore,
the understanding of the Regulations and Rules can only come from the plain
wording of the provisions in the two laws.

CHOW, supranote 4, at 177.
Id.
79
Guizhang Zhiding Chengxu Tiaoli (T $1 r 0 T) [Regulations on
Procedures for the Formulation of Administrative Regulations] (promulgated by the State
Council of the People's Republic of China, Nov. 16, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002), art. 33
(China).
77
78
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VI. THE PLAIN MEANINGS OF ARTICLE 15(5) OF THE
REGULATIONS AND ARTICLE 33 OF THE RULES
An extensive research revealed that foreign law firms frequently violate
the Regulations and Rules by hiring Chinese lawyers to practice Chinese law.8 0
Some scholars argued, however, the unclear provisions in the Regulations and Rules
created a so-called "gray area," blurring the boundaries of what foreign law firms
were permitted to engage in.8 1 Therefore, the foreign law firms' violations of
Chinese law should be justified.82 Others make the same argument that the
ambiguity in the laws leaves the door open for foreign law firms to practice Chinese
law. 83 While these researchers may have presented a helpful argument for the
foreign firms, their assertions have no legal basis. The plain meaning of the law
leaves no room for debate.
To examine the plain meaning of the law, it is useful to read the legal
provision the way a Chinese lawyer or judge would. When there is no official
interpretation, the meaning of the law can only come from the direct reading of the
legal provision, which emphasizes the plain Chinese meaning of each phrase in the
provision. By using this method, the following section examines two key
provisions that scholars claimed were ambiguous.

A. The Plain Meaning of the Two Articles Based on the Xinhua Dictionary
Article 15(5) of the Regulations permits foreign law firms to provide
"information relating to the impact on Chinese legal [or translated as 'regulatory']
environment."
(0W
@MWe ## E ).
Article 33 provides "a
representative organization and its representatives shall not provide specific
comments or opinions on the application of the laws of China when providing
information relating to the influences on China's regulatory environment pursuant
to Item (5) of Paragraph 1 of Article 15 of the Regulations."
Neither the original texts nor the translated texts were intended to be
ambiguous. The two provisions work in tandem for defining the scope of practice
that foreign lawyers are not permitted to engage in providing specific opinions or
judgments concerning the application of both substantive and procedural law.
so
Liu, supra note 14, at 795 ("Although such practices do exist and, from a statutory
point of view, could be interpreted as violations of the government regulation on foreign law
offices, they are still in the gray area and have been tolerated by the BOJs for a long time.").
s
Id. at 780.
82
Id. at 795.
83
Stern & Li, supra note 3, at 201 ("[L]egal ambiguity limits growth by fostering
uncertainty. It is an open secret that foreign law firms offer advice on Chinese law in order
to keep clients happy and stay in business. One experienced lawyer complained that
following the letter of the law means that 'you aren't supposed to do anything! The
requirement to hire a Chinese law firm to provide your client with advice, itjust doesn't work
that way. Clients are not going to accept double bills."').
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To clarify the meaning of the two provisions, it is necessary to consult the
Xinhua Dictionary (9 4), the most authoritative Chinese dictionary, which
contains the following definitions:
I,1 (an effect, to influence, to affect, an influence); 84 Tf'
(to
interfere with).8 5
StA (information, news); 86 r't(news, information).
R (opinion);88 I V; 1',
1L (view, opinion, idea). 89

IUf

(to prove, identification, testimonial); 90 fi

Mk mtM'1JA
4ft X
"tW
(to prove that something is right
or wrong with credible materials or evidence). 91
93
t
-@-4 (specific, concrete); 92 t
S (very clear about details, not in abstract, not in
general).9 5
4

Therefore, a literal translation of Article 15(5) of the Regulations is that
foreign law offices are permitted to transmit legal information or general legal news
relating to the regulatory environment of Chinese law. Legal information or legal
84

Ying

xiang

( W'

fl#] )

[To

Influence],

ONLINE

XINHUA

DICTIONARY,

http://xh.5156edu.com/html5/z82m43j41925.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2017).
85
Gan rao ( -P It
)
[To
Interfere], ONLINE
XINHUA
DICTIONARY,
http://xh.5156edu.com/html5/z93m35j227535.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2017).
86
Xin xi (frg) [Information], ONLINE XINHUA DICTIONARY, http://xh.5156edu.co
m/html5/z47m11j68864.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2017).
87

Xiao

xi

(

#

,t

)

[News],

ONLINE

XINHUA

DICTIONARY,

http://xh.5156edu.com/html5/z47m34j76734.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2017).
88
Yi jian (A T) [Opinion], YABLA, https://chinese.yabla.com/chinese-englishpinyin-dictionary.php?define=%E6%84%8FE8%A7%81 (last visited Oct. 17, 2017).
89
Jianjie (. L#) [Opinion], ONLINE XINHUA DICTIONARY, http://xh.5156edu.com/
html5/z48m48j273280.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2017).
90

Zheng Ming (iiEg)) [Prove], ONLINE XINHUA DICTIONARY, http://xh.5156edu.com/

html5/z34m41j20204.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2017). The Chinese meaning of Zheng
Ming TE B)f is taken from Xinhua Dictionary. The English translation of the Chinese
definition of Zheng Ming TE B)f is also take from the same dictionary.
91
The English translation of the Chinese definition of Zheng ming TE B)f (Ml 48 n)
M $ '
QE#t] li
M) is provided by the author.
92

Ju ti (-M4)

[Specific], ONLINE XINHUA DICTIONARY, http://xh.5156edu.com/

html5/z35m62j290247.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2017).
93

Xi jie(

#fif

1)

[Detail], ONLINE XINHUA DICTIONARY,

http://xh.5156edu.com/

html5/z37m46j84125.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2017).
94

Long tong (tff)

[General] ONLINE XINHUA DICTIONARY, http://xh.5156edu.com/

html5/z44m65j316567.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2017).
95
Except as otherwise footnoted, the English translation of the definitions of the
above terms in parenthesis are taken from the Xinhua Dictionary.
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news is objective in nature. A literal translation of Article 33 of the Rules states
that foreign law offices are not permitted to provide specific or concrete legal
opinions or certification while transmitting information about the Chinese
regulatory environment. The line drawn in the law between merely transmitting
legal information and providing assessments or certification about a specific legal
question is clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous.

B. The Plain Meaning of the Two Articles Based on the Chinese Legal
Dictionary
According to the Westlaw translation, 96 YiT
means "China's
regulatory environment." Westlaw's translation captures the essence of Article
15(5): A general legal sphere rather than specific legal issue. ?{T
is a
frequently used legal term in Chinese law to refer to the general view of the law.
Per the Legal Dictionary (ff NO),
$TAmeans a sphere that covers the state
regulatory regime and the legal consciousness of the state judicial organs and social
organizations. 97 Therefore, the term of iP{eTQ, is clear and unequivocal, and it
does not create a "grey area." iP{eT4#has a consistent meaning throughout the
Chinese language. For example, in Chinese universities, there is a popular course
entitled Commercial Legal Environment, which is a survey course that provides
general information regarding the legal impact on businesses. 98
{Mi.(information): {. s(information means) A ; M!t(message,
news).99
h (opinion): REL (opinion) means)885 (idea); 3HL (opinion).100
The obvious difference between {s (information) and 9 L
(opinion) is that information does not include a personal
subjective opinion. RQ (opinion), however, is an idea formed
through personal thinking or judgment. 101

Regulation on the Management of Representative Offices set up by Foreign Law
Firms in China (promulgated by the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Dec.
22, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002).
97
See ZENG QINGMIN (M rE 4A), FAXUE DA CIDIAN (4
10
) [LEGAL
96

DICTIONARY]

1100 (1Oth ed. 1980).

E.g., Xie Haixia, MBA Business Teaching Content, University of Capital
Economics
(2016),
http://mba.cueb.edu.cn/docs/20161010222208630839.docx
(demonstrating that the Master of Business Administration (MBA) program at the University
of Capital Economics explains that the Legal Environment of Business is an introduction
course that helps students understand the general legal environment for doing business).
98

99

XIANDAI HANYU CIDIAN (f{tii

(7th ed. 2016).
1 Id. at 814.
-ot1d.at 492.

10 A)

[MODERN CHINESE DICTIONARY]

760
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N4(concrete):1 0 2 N4(concrete): T>Af13 (not in abstract), -VY-E
(not in general). 103 As opposed to general information, a concrete
opinion or judgment is specific, detailed, and targeted. The term
N$(concrete) in Article 33 is precise and clear.
0A (proof): 0A (proof) is made based on information. To certify
something is true or untrue1 0 is clearly beyond mere information
transmission.
Reading the above terms together, it is clear Article 15(5) of the
Regulations and Article 33 of the Rules define the boundary between what foreign
law firms can do and cannot do. It is permissible for foreign law firms to transmit
general information regarding the legal impact of Chinese law, but in doing so, they
are prohibited from providing a specific legal opinion on a concrete Chinese legal
issue. If the ends or means of the laws regulating foreign law firms are not desirable,
it is up to the Chinese lawmakers to make necessary adjustments, not foreign law
firms. The plain meanings of Article 15(5) of the Regulations and Article 33 of the
Rules are complementary and compatible.

VII. UNDERSTANDING CHINESE LAW AND POLITICS
A foreign lawyer once boasted: "[if the Chinese government allows me to
practice Chinese law, I'm going to pick the best Chinese lawyers from Fangda, Jun
He [top Chinese law firms]. I'm going to wipe them out." 105 The foreign lawyer's
hyperbole is not only unfortunate, but also reveals ignorance about the Chinese legal
system and the exceptional ability of Chinese lawyers to thrive in a chaotic legal
environment. A lawyer who is successful in the US legal market may not naturally
be successful in China because the two legal systems value different skill sets. In
the United States, it is impossible to become an accomplished lawyer without basic
skills such as self-direction, self-motivation, a commitment to lifelong learning,
effective communication, persuasive rhetoric, analytical thinking, and many
others.106 In China, however, critical thinking and analytical skills may prove
detrimental to one's legal career because subordination is not just a virtue but a
basic means of survival. Chinese lawyers have unique knowledge about China's
legal system and political environment, which is not taught in law schools but
acquired through a combination of upbringing, Darwinian competition, and natural

102 Jit ti (-4,
[Specific], BAIDU ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://baike.baidu.com/
item/%E5%85%B7%E4%BD%93/4577821 (last visited Oct. 17, 2017) (providing that it is
not abstract, not general, the details are clear).
103
Id.
104

XIANDAI HANYU CIDIAN, supra note 99, at 88.4.

Stern & Li, supra note 3, at 199.
17 Skills of Successful Lawyers in 2015: PBI Town Hall Takeaways, PA. BAR.
INST. (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.pbi.org/now/17-skills-of-successful-lawyers-in-2015-pbitown-hall-takeaways.
105

106
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aptitude. Professor Sida Liu succinctly summed up the unique skills required to
practice Chinese law:
For the legal profession, localized expertise is not merely the
technical knowledge of local law on the books, but an experiencebased and culturally sensitive expertise that grows from day-today legal practice. As much of the law and society literature
shows, legal practice is full of uncertainty, inconsistency, and
unintended consequences, thus in their work lawyers often
emphasize insider access and local connections rather than the
formal image of law. 107
The following section explores some unique aspects of Chinese law, which
are essential for a successful practice in China. Even though these aspects of the
law are not taught in Chinese law schools, it is an open secret that law students must
acquire them to ensure survival in the Chinese legal profession. If foreign lawyers
and Chinese lawyers compete to solve a Chinese legal issue in a Chinese court, it
would be unwise to bet on the foreign lawyers.

A. A Brief Overview of the Chinese Legal System
The current Chinese government structure is set forth in the 1982 Chinese
Constitution (Constitution). 108 There are four levels of governments with the
central government placed at the top in Beijing, followed by 31 provincial
governments (including the governments of five ethnic minority regions and four
megacities), 109 each of which oversees numerous city or prefecture governments.
Below the city or prefecture level are the county governments and township
governments. 110
The principle of "democratic centrism" governs the relationships between
the central government and the other three levels of government, which are often
collectively referred to as "local governments.""' This means that lower level
governments are subordinate to higher level governments and all local governments
are subordinate to the central government.112 Unlike the individual states of the
United States, provinces or their equivalents do not have their own constitutions.
107

1os

Liu, supra note 14, at 775.
XIANFA ch. 3, (1982) (China).

109 See generally CHOW, supra note 4. In addition to 22 provinces, five autonomous
regions of ethnic minorities, and four megacities in the mainland, the People's Republic of
China has two Special Administrative Regions, namely Hong Kong and Macau, which have
their own legal systems. China also regards Taiwan a renegade province, which has a
distinctive legal system. This overview is limited to the description of mainland China. Id.
110 Id. Below the county level are township governments, which only have branches
of the basic county courts, called people's tribunals. Id.
"' Id. at 86.
112 CHOW, supranote 4, at 86.
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In practice, the Party holds the country's real power.1 13 The structure of the Party
committee parallels each level of government. Thus, at each of the four levels, there
are two sets of leadership, one from the government and another from the Party
committee.
Within each Party committee, there is a political legal office
supervising judicial affairs.114
At the central level, there are six major state organs: the NPC and its
Standing Committee, the State President, the Central Military Commission, the
State Council, the Supreme People's Court (SPC), and the People's Supreme
Procuratorate (a prosecutorial organ). 115 Each of the local governments have
similar organs except for a military commission. 116
The judicial system in China consists of four levels of courts including the
SPC at the top, the people's high courts at the provincial level, the people's
intermediate courts at the city or prefecture level, and the people's basic court at the
county level. 117 There are ordinarily two steps in the legal process: a trial at a court
and an appeal to the next higher-level court. Theoretically, the SPC can try a case
of first instance, for which there is no appeal, but this has rarely happened in practice.
From a literal reading of the Constitution, it appears that the NPC holds
the highest state power and other state organs are responsible to the NPC.118 In
practice, the State Council is the central government, which directs social and
economic affairs of the entire country. 119 Administratively, the SPC is a level below
the State Council.120 Despite the fact that the Constitution mandates that the SPC
work independently,121 the lower administrative rank in reality makes it impossible
for the SPC to conduct juridical affairs without being subject to outside pressures.
Thus, the judiciary is an integral part of the government, rather than a co-equal
branch that provides checks and balances on other state organs.122
At the local level, the weakness of the judiciary is equally, if not more,
pronounced. Even though the Constitution gives the Local People's Congress (LPC)
the power to approve a candidate for president of the local court, it is impossible for
the LPC to disapprove a nominee put forward by the government and the Party.123
Therefore, the government and the Party maintain complete control of the
113
114
115
116
117
118

119
120
121
122

CHOW, supranote 4, at ch. 4.
Id. at 122.
XIANFA ch. 3, (1982) (China).
Id.
CHOW, supranote 4, at 192.
XIANFA art. 57, § 1 (1982) (China).

Id. at art. 85, § 3.
CHOW, supranote 4, at 195.
Id. at 196.
Id.

See U.S. DEP'TOF STATE, CHINA (Mar. 11, 2008), https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/
hrrpt/2007/100518.htm; JiaqiangDangDui Renda Gongzuo De Lingdao Tuidong Renda
Gongzuo Chuangxin Fazhan (Pll?
A I
#jt)
[To
Enhance the Party's Leadership over the People's Congress and Move the People's
Congress's Work Forward Creatively], GUANGZHOU GOV'T (July 11, 2017),
http://www.gz.gov.cn/gzgov/s5811/201707/90ac65d6505a4a748f02256d75alf571.shtml.
123
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appointment and promotion of local judges. The most serious problems plaguing
the Chinese legal system are local protectionism, lack ofjudicial independence, and
judicially coerced settlements.

B. Local Protectionism and Reluctance to Rule Against Local Industries
Local governments are reluctant to enforce the laws that could burden local
businesses and slow local economic growth 124 because of deep-rooted local
12 6
Professors
protectionism.125 About "25-35% of all judgments are not enforced."
Benjamin L. Liebman and Curtis Milhaupt observed, "[1]ocal protectionism is
perhaps the single biggest problem undermining China's efforts to strengthen its
legal system, and the combination of devolved authority and local protectionism
127
frequently lead to under enforcement."
The economic reforms started in the 1980s have reshaped the relationship
between the central and local governments. One major aspect of the economic
reforms is decentralization- shifting some important decision-making power from
the central to local governments.128 The purpose of the shift is to maximize the
provinces' capability to achieve economic growth. The central government
depends on each local region to grow its economy so the nation's overall growth
can be maintained.
Decentralization does not mean sending the power back to the local people.
As in the pre-reform era, local leaders are appointed by the central government

(Thk), Shipin anquan reng duotou guanli weiyuan huyu chedi gaige
If ;LA1 T }VrJ ) [Food Safety Enforcement Still Relies on
Multiple Local Agencies and Experts Have Thus Expressed Doubt About the Effectiveness
of the New Food Safety Law], CHENGDU SHANGBAO (
¶iR) [CHENGDU DAILY] (Mar.
1, 2009), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2009-03-01/032315236384s.shtml.
125
See Chenglin Liu, Profits Above the Law: China's Melamine Tainted Milk
Incident, 79 Miss L. J. 371 (2009).
126
CHOW, supranote 4, at 230.
127
Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis Milhaupt, Reputational Sanctions in China's
Securities market, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 929 (2007). See also Eric Priest, The Future
of Music and Film Piracy in China, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 795, 822 (2006) ("Local
protectionism probably constitutes the largest obstacles to cracking down on piracy in
China."); Srini Sitaraman, Regulating the Belching Dragon: Rule of Law, Politics of
Enforcement, and Pollution Prevention in Post-Mao Industrial China, 18 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 267, 335 (2007) (arguing that "the lack of strong centralized
environmental administration and deep-seated political unwillingness to disrupt economic
growth, combined with correction and local protectionism, has precluded China from fully
complying with its international treaty obligations and enforcing its domestic environmental
law.").
128 See YONGNIAN ZHENG, GLOBALIZATION AND STATE TRANSFORMATION IN CHINA
109 (2004); YONGNIAN ZHENG, DE FACTO FEDERALISM IN CHINA: REFORMS AND DYNAMICS
OF CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONS 55 (2007); JUNMIN WANG, STATE-MARKET INTERACTIONS IN
124

Zhang Ling

(1taf 2

CHINA'S REFORM ERA: LOCAL STATE COMPETITION AND GLOBAL MARKET BUILDING IN THE
TOBACCO INDUSTRY 33 (2014).
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rather than truly elected by the local people.129 As a result, the primary criterion for
the central government in selecting local leaders is how well they can develop local
gross domestic product (GDP).1 30
To grow the local economy, local leaders forge close ties with businesses
in their communities. These close relationships are always mutually beneficial. 3
The local government relies on local businesses to grow GDP, a much-needed
political credit for the leaders to retain their jobs or seek a promotion. In return, the
132
local government takes measures to reduce production costs for local businesses.
For example, a local government in the Anhui Province suspended six local
environmental protection agency officials because they conducted three
environmental inspections of a factory in a twenty day span. 133 The local
government claimed that frequent enforcement actions damaged its businessfriendly image and hampered future investment in the region.134 One commentator
observed:
Local protectionism in China has seriously challenged judicial
independence and its ability to reform. It is usually the root cause
for the [undue] delay and impediments to enforcing foreignrelated [arbitration] awards because the local courts depend on
local governments for personnel and financial support while local
governments rely on local companies for revenue. This interest
becomes a high priority when the enforcement of an award could
risk economic ruin for a small to medium-sized town heavily or
even entirely dependent on a target company's operations and
financial welfare.
Protecting the local companies from
enforcement-to submit to and carry out a potentially detrimental
award-is in turn, to protect the courts themselves.1 35

129
MARK KESSELMAN, JOEL KRIEGER, & WILLIAM A. JOSEPH, INTRODUCTION
TO
POLITICS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 658 (6th ed. 2012) ("The most powerful positions in

the [Chinese] government, such as city mayors and provincial governors, are appointed, not
elected."). See also CHENG LI, CHINESE POLITICS IN THE XI JINPING ERA: REASSESSING
COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP 69 (2016).
130 S. PHILIP Hsu, YU-SHAN Wu, & SUISHENG ZHAO, IN SEARCH OF CHINA'S
DEVELOPMENT MODEL: BEYOND THE BEIJING CONSENSUS 242 (2011).
131
ROBERT GRAFSTEIN & FAN WEN, A BRIDGE Too FAR?: COMMONALITIES AND
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES

109 (2009).

See generally Wayne M. Morrison, China's Economic Rise: History, Trends,
Challenges, and Implicationsfor the UnitedStates, CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERV. (Sept. 15,
2017).
133 Wang Jin (fflJ), Zhongguo huanjingfazhi weihe shibai? (###T# #t91j#
132

ft? ) [Why EnvironmentalLaw in China Has Failed?], CHINA DIALOGUE (Sept. 23, 2010),
http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/ch/3831--China-s-green-laws-are-useless-.
134

Id.

135

Christina Cheung, Comment, The Enforcement Methodology of Non-Domestic

Arbitral Awards Rendered in the U.S. & Foreign-RelatedArbitral Awards Rendered in
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C. Lack of Judicial Independence
According to the Organic Law of People's Court, 13 6 each court establishes
an adjudication committee, whose members are chosen by the president of the court
and approved by the people's congress. 137 Usually, the adjudication committee is
composed of the president, chief judges in each chamber, and associate judges.
The official objective of the adjudication committee is to gather individuals with
trial experience and discuss significant or difficult cases and other issues related to
trial. In practice, however, the adjudication committee has shifted from discussing
to deciding the outcome of cases that it deems "significant" or "difficult." Thus,
the presiding judge cannot issue a valid judgment without both the president and
the adjudication committee's approval.
The existence of the adjudication
committee seriously threatens judicial independence for the following reasons.
First, the adjudication committee is composed of the court president and
judges recommended by the president. 139 These members may be skilled
administrators but they are not necessarily seasoned judges. In fact, some members
of the adjudication committee have never been career judges.140 Membership on
the committee signifies a high social status and does not reflect one's qualifications
in the legal field.
Second, while the adjudication committee meetings are always held
behind closed doors, its decisions are nonetheless binding on affected parties.
Typically, the adjudication committee routinely convenes to discuss and decide a
number of cases all in one meeting.141 Before the meeting, members of the
committee normally do not have time to review court documents. They make
decisions solely based on the presiding judge's presentation at the meeting.142
Without formal court proceedings and presentations by lawyers from both sides, the
presiding judge has wide discretion in deciding how he reports the case to the
committee.143 Since all of the committee meeting records are secret, it is almost
impossible for concerned parties to know whether the committee adequately
discussed their issue and made a fair decision. In one case, a follow-up investigation
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revealed that the presiding judge misled the adjudication committee. As a result,
the committee made the wrong decision. 144 It is not clear how often this type of
follow-up investigation is conducted.

D. Judicial Corruption
Despite China having the second largest economy in the world, China's
judicial system suffers from severe corruption problems rarely seen in leading
economies. Judicial corruption has not been a subject of credible empirical study,145
but the public in China regards judicial corruption as a common phenomenon.146 A
few significant scandals speak to the gravity of this entrenched problem.
In August 2015, Xi Xiaoming, the Vice President of the SPC, was under
both criminal and Party disciplinary investigation for the corruption that he and his
family members perpetrated.147 Law enforcement found a trove of cash in the
amount of RMB 300,000,000 ($43,185,000) while searching the home of Xi's
son.148 Even the investigators, who often uncovered cash troves from corrupt
officials' homes, were dumbfounded by this staggering amount of money found in
a single search.149 The junior Xi had no explanation for the source of the cash. The
subsequent investigation revealed that the junior Xi had a law firm in Shenzhen that
specialized in cases involving massive business disputes. 150 Taking advantage of
the senior Xi's influence, the junior Xi sought favors for his clients in provincial,
city, and county courts, which were all under his father's supervision. In addition,
151
the junior Xi received bribes from those who sought his father's direct favor.
Moreover, Xi's wife and another SPC justice were also implicated in the corruption
investigation. 152
On October 18, 2016, the State Procuratorate (a prosecutorial organ)
officially brought a criminal charge against Xi, alleging he took advantage of his
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office to receive bribes, a crime that is punishable by life imprisonment.15 3 Xi was
accused of divulging vital secrets in the course of judicial proceedings over which
he presided. In addition, Xi was expelled from the Party for violation of Party
discipline, mainly because his deeds damaged the image of the Party.154 Xi's case
is pending before the Tianjin No. 2 Intermediate Court.1 55 In a country where the
conviction rate is over 99.9%,156 there is little doubt that Xi will be found guilty and
sentenced to harsh punishment.
It might be shocking to see one of the nation's top jurists fall from grace
in such a dramatic fashion, but Xi was not the first. In January 2009, Huang
Songyou, Vice President of the SPC, was sentenced to life imprisonment for the
same crime that Xi committed.1 5 7 During his tenure as the Vice President of the
SPC, he traded his influence on cases in the judicial system for bribes in the amount
of RMB 3,900,000 (S561,316.58).15
In 2013, two Vice Presidents of the Shanghai High People's Court were
convicted for collectively patronizing prostitutes with funds paid by parties to a case
they adjudicated. 15 9 The two judges were incarcerated for ten days and expelled
from the High People's Court.
The Party expelled them from the party
organization.160 These high-profile corruption cases have greatly eroded public
trust in China's judicial system.
The so-called "empirical studies" on judicial corruption are inherently
unreliable.

In his work entitled China's Long March Toward Rule of Law,

published by the Cambridge Press, Professor Peerenboom stated: "Reliable
statistics on the scope of corruption are not available for obvious reasons. However,
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even official accounts acknowledge that the corruption is becoming more serious
and widespread." 161 It is inconceivable for any judge to admit his own guilt.
Professor Carl Minzner claims that in recent years "China actually looked
like back when it had full-blown personalized rule." 162 In his article entitled
China's Turn Against Law, Professor Minzner provides a vivid account of how
Chinese courts have increasingly become beholden to influences outside the
judiciary.163 The reluctance of Chinese judges to admit their corrupt practices will
remain a serious problem in China for an indefinite period. Professor Peerenboom's
earlier observations ring as true now as when they were made in 2002:
[Judicial] corruption is systemic; it is a pervasive social problem.
One can hardly expect judges to be honest when government and
Party officials from the top to bottom are busily filling their
pockets. 1 6 Moreover, an independent and authoritative judiciary
alone is not enough to ensure rule of law. It will take years to
produce a competent and honest corps of judges. 165
A sound empirical study starts with the right data. Without reliable data,
even a well-trained social scientist equipped with the finest statistical formula has
no way to produce meaningful, reliable, and convincing research. An old Chinese
saying sums it up well: "Even a clever housewife cannot cook a meal without
rice."166

E. Judicially Coerced Settlements
Between 2010 and 2014, plaintiffs often faced intense pressure from
judges to settle with defendants through judicial mediation.167 A judicially forced
settlement or mediation is binding on both parties and enforceable by the court. 168
Judicial mediation in civil cases started in the 1930s, before the Party took
control of China.169 Since then, judicial mediation has become an important means
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of dispute resolution. Since Wang Shengjun became the President of the SPC in
2008, courts across China substantially changed their trial methods. Wang, a
trained historian, was fond of the experience of the 1930s, and aggressively urged
lower courts to use mediation as a primary means of dispute resolution. 17 0 In June
2010, the SPC issued an important notice to lower courts requiring mediation take
priority over trial.17 1 In its notice, the SPC stated:
We must firmly establish the principle of giving priority to
mediation, which is the most efficient and highest quality trial.17 2
Mediation is conducive to solving social problems, ending
conflicts, repairing damaged personal relations between parties,
and achieving a harmonious society. Therefore, courts must
recognize the important and unique role that mediation plays in
the dispute solution process. Courts must shift the focus from
trial to mediation and ensure that mediation is the first choice of
method in dealing with disputes.
The SPC requires the court to use mediation as the primary means of
resolution and only use trial as a last resort. In difficult cases or cases of significant
influence, lower courts should coordinate and consult with the local branches of the
Party, the people's congress, and the administrative department at higher levels.174
By requiring lower courts to reach out to other departments, the SPC clearly
undercuts the requirement of judicial independence that is mandated by the
Constitution.1 75
Therefore, Chinese law is extremely complicated. China's bar passage
rate is about 10%. 176 After passing the bar, a candidate must successfully
System], TIANJIN BUREAU OF JUSTICE (Mar. 28, 2017), http://www.tjsf.gov.cn/system/
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accomplish an internship at law firms for one-year before being licensed. In an
interview, a lawyer stated, "With 9 years' experience in practice, I still constantly
learn something new. For difficult cases, I still have to consult colleagues and
professors at law schools."
Without formal training in Chinese law, Chinese
language, Chinese culture, and its unique political environment, a foreign lawyer is
unlikely to fit in practicing Chinese law. The Regulations and Rules protect not
only Chinese lawyers, but also Chinese consumers' interests. This is the reason
why China has its own system of admitting lawyers to practice and prohibit foreign
lawyers from practicing Chinese law.

VIII. PRESSURES MOUNTED AGAINST FOREIGN INVESTORS IN
CHINA
In 2007, the Standing Committee of the People's Congress enacted the
anti-monopoly law (AML), which took effect on August 1, 2008.178 On its face,
the objective of the AML is to prevent monopolistic conduct, promote the
development of socialist market economy, and protect fair market competition,
economic efficiency, and consumer interests. 17 9 However, the real purpose of the
AML, as Professor Daniel C.K. Chow observed, is to "further the industrial policy
goals established by the Party." 80 Specifically, the Chinese authorities used the
AML to benefit Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) at the expense of
multinational companies (MNCs).181 To many MNCs, the AML is "protectionist,
1 82
nationalistic, and discriminatory."
To avoid investors' attention, the Chinese government implemented the
AML quietly.1 83 Three government agencies are responsible for enforcing the
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AML. The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) 1 84 reviews proposed mergers and
acquisitions (M&A) that will take place in China and, if the involved companies
have a presence in the Chinese market, in other countries as well.18 5 The State
Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC) and its local offices have the
authority to initiate an investigation of anti-competitive conduct.186 The National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has the power to impose fines for
anti-competitive conduct.
From 2008 to 2014, the government only focused on
reviewing M&A applications.1 8 8 Even though the MOFCOM denied several highprofile M&A proposals, foreign investors remained optimistic about the Chinese
market. 189
Two years after the ascent of Xi Jinping, who ushered in the new wave of
nationalistic and protectionist sentiment, the government suddenly accelerated the
enforcement of the AML, targeting foreign companies. 190 Xi's signature slogan
"China Dream" of national rejuvenation, is not only a metaphor but a concrete
objective that has been firmly carried out in the administration of social, economic,
diplomatic, and international affairs. 19 1 From a fervent nationalistic point of view,
foreign investors are the main obstacles that prevent domestic companies, especially
the SOEs, from becoming global players.192
From 2014 through 2016, Chinese authorities launched a series of
campaigns for increased scrutiny on foreign companies. 193 Regulators have
184
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investigated, raided, and penalized many foreign firms for corruption, antitrust
violations, and tax evasion.194 Investigations have spanned from the automobile

&
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the World Trade Organization rules. Chow, supra note 186, at 99. Major newspapers
published a series of articles that documented these cases. G.M's Venture in China Fined
$29
Million Under Antimonopoly Law,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
23,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/23/business/gm-china-penalty.html; Keith Bradsher
Chis Buckley, China Fines GlaxoSmithKline Nearly $500 Million in Bribery Case, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 16, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/20/business/intemational/gskchina-fines.html; Neil Gough & Chris Buckley, Mercedes-Benz to Pay Fine in Chinato Settle
Price-Fixing Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/04/24/business/intemational/chinese-regulators-fine-mercedes-benz-over-pricefixing.html; Paul Mozur & Nick Wingfield, Microsoft Faces New Scrutiny in China, N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan. 5, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/06/business/intemational/
microsoft-china-antitrust-inquiry.html; Paul Mozur & Quentin Hardy, ChinaHits Qualcomm
with Fine, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/10/business/
international/qualcomm-fine-china-antitrust-investigation.html; Keith Bradsher, China to
CrackDown on Tax Collectionfrom MultinationalCompanies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/05/business/intemational/china-to-enforce-taxcollection-from-multinational-companies.html; Neil Gouch, China's Antitrust Campaign
Seen as Possible Breach of WT.O. Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
8, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/09/business/intemational/us-group-says-china-could-beviolating-trade-accords.html; Keith Bradsher, No Longer Business As Usual in China, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 9, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/10/business/international/nolonger-business-as-usual-in-china-.html [hereinafter Badsher, No Longer Business]; China
Fines Japanese Auto Supplies for Antitrust Violations, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/20/business/international/china-fines-japanese-autosuppliers-for-antitrust-violations.html; Neil Gough, Western Companies Appear to Push
Back Against Chinese Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/
2014/09/04/business/intemational/chinese-antitrust-investigations-alarm-westerncompanies.html; China Fines Global Shipping Firms for Price-Fixing, BBC (Dec. 28,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-35188120; Laurie Burkitt & Colum Murphy,
China Using Antimonopoly Law to Pressure Foreign Businesses, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4,
2014),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-using-antimonopoly-law-to-pressure-foreignbusinesses-1407154916; Anna Zhang, China Fines Tetra Pak Record $97 Million for
Antitrust Violations, CORP. COUNSEL (Nov.
16, 2016), http://www.corpcounsel.com/
id=1202772558342/China-Fines-Tetra-Pak-Record-97-Million-for-AntitrustViolations?slretum=20170118104404; Denyer, supra note 192; Jeffrey Rothfeder, The
Great
Unraveling of
Globalization,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
24,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/reconsidering-the-value-ofglobalization/2015/04/24/7b5425c2-e82e-11 e4-aael-d642717d8afa story.html; Catherine
Rampell, The Truth About China's Currency Devaluation, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-truth-about-chinas-currency-devaluation/
2015/08/13/7418fbf0-41eO-11e5-8e7d-9cO33e6745d8_story.html; China Said Preparedto
Retaliate if Trump Raises Trade Barriers, JAKARTA POST (Jan.
8, 2017),
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/01/06/china-said-prepared-to-retaliate-if-trumpraises-trade-barriers.html.
194
See Mozur & Hardy, supra note 193 (finding China is scrutinizing foreign entities
for corruption, tax evasion, and antitrust violations).

160

Arizona JournalofInternational& ComparativeLaw

Vol. 35, No. 1

2018

and technology sectors to the medical industry and consumer products such as baby
formula, milk, and contact lenses. 195 For example, after storming four China-based
Microsoft offices, questioning executives, and copying contracts, records, and data
from Microsoft servers in July 2014, SAIC regulators began investigating
Microsoft's business practices in China in January 2016.196 In 2014, authorities
imposed multimillion-dollar
fines
on the
multinational
corporations
GlaxoSmithKline, Chrysler, Volkswagen, Audi, BMW, Samsung, Mead Johnson,
and Johnson & Johnson. 197 Many foreign firms received substantial penalties from
the Chinese legal and regulatory system:
*

*

*
*

In August 2014, twelve Japanese automotive parts manufacturers were
ordered to pay a total of $200 million in fines. Specifically, the NDRC
fined two Japanese manufacturers of automotive bearings for antitrust
violations. NSK's fine equaled RMB 174,900,000 ($28.4 million), and
NTN's penalty amounted to RMB 119,200,000 ($19.4 million). 198
In September 2014, Chinese authorities imposed a $40.5 million fine on
Audi for offending the AML, and a Chinese court fined GlaxoSmithKline,
a British pharmaceutical company, $500 million for bribery.199
In February 2015, the NDRC fined the American chip manufacturer
Qualcomm $975 million for violating China's AML.2 00
In April 2015, antitrust officials found Mercedes-Benz guilty of setting
prices on cars and parts and issued a penalty of RMB 350,000,000 ($57
million).201
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In December 2015, the NDRC fined seven international shipping
202
companies $65 million for price fixing and thereby violating the AML.
In November 2016, the SAIC charged Tetra Pak International S.A., a
Swedish packaging firm, $97 million for abusing its dominance in the
market.2 0 3

*

In December 2016, Chinese regulators imposed a RMB 201,000,000 ($29
million) fine on General Motors's joint venture, Shanghai G.M., for
improperly restraining competition by establishing minimum sales prices
for its dealers. 2 0

The policy shift has greatly impacted foreign investors in China. In
January 2017, the American Chamber of Commerce found 80% of the survey
respondents believed foreign firms were less welcome in China,2 05 a 40% rise since
2013.206 In addition, 49% of those surveyed felt Chinese officials were targeting
207
foreign businesses with pricing and antitrust campaigns2.
Many foreign firms
208
assert they are victims of an increasing economic nationalism in China, which
results in attacking foreign companies to protect the domestic firms' market
209
share2.
The report claimed the fines and antimonopoly tactics "often appear
designed to advance industrial policy and boost national champions." 2 1 0 Vice
Chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in China, Lester Ross, cited the
pharmaceutical, medical device, automobile, and technology industries as sectors
that China seems to be targeting.211 The purpose of bringing down foreign firms is
to narrow the gap between foreign and domestic companies, allowing Chinese firms
2 12
to "catch up with the rest of the world."

See China Fines Global Shipping Firmsfor Price-Fixing,supra note 193 (stating
the NDRC, after a twelve-month investigation, found the shipping companies cooperated in
order to keep prices high and imposed a RMB 407,000,000 fine, amounting to approximately
$65 million).
203
See Zhang, supra note 193 ("China's [SAIC] has fined Swedish packaging giant
Tetra Pak International S.A. $97 million for abusing market dominance.").
204 See G.M's Venture in China Fined $29 Million Under Antimonopoly Law, supra
note 193 (announcing the Shanghai Price Bureau stated Shanghai G.M. suppressed normal
market competition and issued a penalty of $29 million).
205
Michael Martina, U.S. Lobby Says China ProtectionismFueling ForeignBusiness
Pessimism, REUTERS Bus. NEWS (Jan. 18, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-chinausa-business-idUSKBN 1 520EY.
202

206

U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SEC. REV. COMM'N, THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT CLIMATE IN
45 (Jan. 28, 2015).

CHINA: PRESENT CHALLENGES AND POTENTIAL FOR REFORM
207

Id.
See Mozur & Hardy, supra note 193 (providing the argument proposed by the
multinational firms).
209
See Rothfeder, supra note 193 (proposing emerging nations attack foreign MNCs
to preserve the domestic firms' market share).
210 COMPETING INTERESTS IN CHINA, supra note 11,
at ii.
211 See Denyer, supranote 192 (including the statements of Lester Ross in his article).
212 Id.
208
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The Chinese government follows a strategy of fining and regulating
foreign firms, keeping them from gaining too much market share, favoring domestic
213
firms, and protecting its citizens from high prices2.
Foreign companies attempt to
avoid investigation and penalties by joining state-owned firms or cultivating
relationships with powerful Chinese leaders and, when those tactics fail, pay the
214
fines2.
As Professor Chow observed, "China will only become more aggressive,
and MNCs may find themselves at a great disadvantage by the time the United
States and other developed countries fully realize the extent to which China is using
these aggressive tactics to promote its economic interests."2 1 5
In March 2017, the Chinese government issued the strategic plan "Made
in China by 2025," which aims at replacing foreign-produced high-tech goods, such
216
as planes, computer chips, and electric cars, with Chinese-made products2.
The
government will provide domestic industries with $300 billion in subsidies to
217
develop new technologies2.
Industries in the West fear that the plan will further
disadvantage foreign companies in the Chinese market.218 Therefore, it is unlikely
that China will reverse its restrictive and hostile regulatory environment for foreign
investors anytime soon.

IX. CONCLUSION
Foreign law firms and researchers attempt to convince themselves that
Chinese law is unclear in order to justify their violation of the Regulations and Rules
that prohibit foreign lawyers from practicing Chinese law. However, this ostrich
tactic will not change the plain meaning of the law. By denying reality, foreign law
firms could put both their own interests and their clients' interests at risk. China is
striving to protect the domestic legal market, which ultimately leads to restrictions
on foreign law firms in China. Therefore, the Chinese government has not
expanded the scope of activities and businesses in which foreign law firms are

.

213
See Burkitt & Murphy, supranote 193 (including one law firm partner's statement
that Chinese officials believe multinational companies are exploiting Chinese consumers);
China Fines Global Shipping Firms for Price-Fixing, supra note 193 (asserting Chinese
regulators utilize the AML to penalize companies and reduce prices for Chinese consumers);
Mozur & Wingfield, supra note 193 (describing some Western critics accuse China of
utilizing its regulatory and court systems to penalize foreign firms and assist domestic firms);
Rothfeder, supra note 193 ("To protect the [market share] of domestic firms, emerging
nations have attacked foreign multinationals.").
214 See Burkitt & Murphy, supra note 193 (opining targeted companies "have little
choice but to comply" because the Party controlled Chinese courts offer no option for
redress); Mozur & Nick, supranote 193 (explaining MNCs "have for years gone out of their
way to curry favor with leaders in China" and employed strategies, such as investing in
SOEs); Zhang, supra note 193 (reporting a company representative stated Tetra Pak accepted
and will not appeal the decision)
215
Chow, supra note 180, at 457.
216
Bradsher & Mozur, supra note 193.
217
Id.
218
Id.
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permitted to engage, and is highly unlikely to do so in the future. It is time for
foreign law firms to wake up and prepare themselves for the wave of nationalistic
policies targeting foreign investors in China.

